COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Truong, 2025 ONCA 69

DATE: 20250130

DOCKET: C70076

Zarnett, Coroza and Monahan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

His Majesty the King

Respondent

and

Jeffrey Truong

Appellant

Nathan Gorham and Breana Vandebeek, for the appellant

Jeremy Tatum, for the respondent

Heard: May 8, 2024

On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Paddy A. Hardman of the Ontario Court of Justice on April 21, 2021.

Zarnett J.A.:

OVERVIEW

[1]          The appellant was convicted of eight firearms offences, all of which stemmed from his possession of a loaded Glock handgun. The handgun was discovered on his person while police officers were arresting him for an alleged parole violation.

[2]          The appellant challenges his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the handgun from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[1] The appellant submits that the trial judge properly found a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter due to police delay in permitting him to speak to his lawyer following his arrest, justifying consideration of whether the handgun should be excluded. He argues, however, that the trial judge improperly viewed that breach in a vacuum, instead of as part of a pattern of Charter violations that included two post-arrest warrantless searches of the apartment he lived in with his girlfriend. This approach minimized the seriousness and impact of the breaches. He asks this court to undertake a fresh s. 24(2) analysis and conclude that the handgun should have been excluded because its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[3]          For the reasons that follow I would dismiss the appeal.

[4]          The appellant was arrested pursuant to a lawful warrant. The handgun was discovered through a lawful search incident to that arrest – a search the trial judge found was carried out in a reasonable manner given officer and civilian safety concerns. While I agree with the appellant that the trial judge did not properly consider the interrelation among the Charter breaches that occurred after the handgun was discovered, and that a fresh s. 24(2) analysis is therefore required, I ultimately reach the same conclusion as the trial judge.

[5]          Although the breaches, in totality, were serious, pulling toward exclusion, their impact on the appellant’s Charter-protected rights was minimal, pulling toward admission. The breaches all occurred after the lawful discovery of the handgun – none of the breaches were causally related to the discovery of the handgun or to any other evidence that was used in the prosecution of the appellant. The police did not proceed with charges, against the appellant or his girlfriend, arising from what they observed in the warrantless entries. The handgun was reliable evidence critical to the prosecution of the appellant on serious firearms offences – society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits also pulls toward admission. Balancing the factors leads to the conclusion that excluding the handgun is not warranted, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

FACTUAL CONTEXT

[6]          The appellant does not challenge the trial judge’s factual findings, from which the following summary is gleaned.

[7]          At the time of his arrest, on May 20, 2020, the appellant was on parole. He had previously been convicted of manslaughter involving a firearm. A Canada-wide warrant for his arrest had been issued on October 11, 2019 due to an alleged parole violation.

[8]          Two different police forces were sequentially involved in dealing with the appellant on the day of his arrest: officers of the Repeat Offender Parole Enforcement (“ROPE”) Squad, a division of the Ontario Provincial Police, and officers of the Waterloo Regional Police Service (“WRPS”).

[9]          In the course of a search in Waterloo for the appellant and his associate, Mr. Krecko (for whom they also had a warrant), undercover ROPE officers recognized the appellant walking a dog with a woman in the courtyard of an apartment building. The ROPE officers believed the appellant might be armed. One of them, Officer McKenzie, identified himself as police, grabbed the appellant’s left arm and told him he was under arrest. The appellant tried to pull away, took three steps and broke Officer McKenzie’s hold. The appellant was then taken to the ground. He initially resisted and did not follow commands to show his hands while on his stomach. Additional ROPE officers attempted to get control of him. Officer Alcock, concerned that the appellant’s hands were near his waistband where there might be a weapon, struck the appellant three or four times to distract him and encourage him to show his hands.

[10]       Within 40 seconds of the encounter beginning, the appellant stopped resisting and was placed in handcuffs. The arrest was effected at about 3:50 p.m.

[11]       The appellant told the ROPE officers that he had a gun in his jacket, which the officers located. They placed the appellant in leg restraints as he was considered a flight risk. As the undercover ROPE officers did not travel in police cruisers, they contacted the WRPS and waited, with the appellant at roadside, for them to arrive.

[12]       Officer McKenzie told the appellant, within two or three minutes of his arrest, that he had the right to counsel and could contact counsel from the police station. Officer McKenzie testified that he thought it was safer to wait until the appellant was at the station to let him contact counsel, given the restraints he was wearing and the lack of privacy at roadside.

[13]       The WRPS then became involved. Two of its members, Officers Ryan and Esentepe, received custody of the appellant at roadside at 4:05 p.m. At 4:10 p.m., Officer Ryan informed the appellant of the charges against him – unlawfully at large, possession of a gun, and breach of a weapons prohibition – and of his right to counsel. The appellant told Officer Ryan he wanted to speak to a lawyer. Officer Ryan testified that contact with counsel could not be implemented at roadside since the appellant was still in restraints and could not be given privacy.

[14]       Meanwhile, after the appellant was secured, ROPE officers had turned their attention to finding Mr. Krecko. They spoke with Ms. Duong, the appellant’s girlfriend who had been accompanying him when he was apprehended. She said that she lived in the apartment building, that the appellant was staying with her, and that there was a room in her apartment that she was not allowed to enter. She denied knowledge of Mr. Krecko but did not know if anyone else was in the apartment.

[15]       The ROPE officers wondered if Mr. Krecko was hiding in the apartment. They asked Ms. Duong for permission to enter the apartment to look for him but did not tell her she could refuse consent. Nor did they ask the appellant for his permission. Ms. Duong gave her consent. ROPE officers entered the apartment at 3:59 p.m. and remained for about seven or eight minutes. They did not find Mr. Krecko, but they saw a significant quantity of drugs and drug paraphernalia, which they did not remove. They posted an officer at the door, intending to seek a warrant to search the apartment.

[16]       For various reasons, including a decision made by the WRPS to await the results of the entry into the apartment and any additional charges that might come out of that, Officer Ryan was instructed by his superior to keep the appellant at roadside. Eventually, Officer Ryan was informed that the appellant should be arrested for possession and trafficking of methamphetamines. At 5:09 p.m. he arrested the appellant on those new charges and read him additional rights to counsel. The appellant confirmed that he wished to speak to counsel and acknowledged he would be permitted to do so at the station.

[17]       At 5:16 p.m., Officer Ryan transported the appellant to the station where they arrived at 5:29 p.m. The appellant was presented to the duty sergeant at 5:45 p.m. and at 5:54 p.m. he was lodged in a cell. By 5:57 p.m., the appellant had spoken to a lawyer. At 6:26 p.m., more firearm-related charges were laid. The appellant declined an opportunity to speak with counsel again.

[18]       Ms. Duong was also arrested and taken to the police station. The WRPS determined not to proceed with a request for a warrant to search the apartment, or with any drug charges resulting from the ROPE officers’ warrantless search. Ms. Duong was released unconditionally at 11:26 p.m. and the appellant was not prosecuted on the drug charges.

[19]       Staff Sergeant Bresso of the WRPS then directed three uniformed officers to conduct another warrantless entry into the apartment to seize the drugs and destroy them. No consent was sought or obtained. The officers were in the apartment from 11:48 p.m. to 11:56 p.m., seizing suspected cocaine and amphetamines.

THE DECISION BELOW

[20]       The matter proceeded as a blended trial and Charter application.

[21]       The appellant sought to have the handgun excluded pursuant to ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter due to a pattern of violations made up of: his physical treatment at the hands of the officer during the arrest; the failure of several of the officers to record the details of that arrest; the violation of his privacy rights by the first entry into the apartment without legal justification; miscommunication between the police forces; his rights to counsel being given improperly and their implementation delayed; and the second entry into the apartment without legal justification. To the extent the Charter violations involved ss. 7 and 10(b), the appellant raised them as part of the alleged pattern underlying his main argument, that the warrantless entries breached s. 8, rather than as freestanding bases for relief.

[22]       The trial judge found that the officers had acted appropriately and had not used excessive force in arresting the appellant, given (i) the information they had about the appellant who was thought to have been involved with firearms before, and (ii) his refusal to show his hands when requested.

[23]       The trial judge then considered whether the appellant’s s. 10(b) rights were violated and the impact of that breach on the admission of the handgun. She expressly did so separately from any consideration of the s. 8 breaches.

[24]       She found the appellant’s s. 10(b) rights were violated because his opportunity to contact counsel was not immediate but delayed. The trial judge calculated the total delay as 2 hours and 7 minutes from the appellant’s arrest to his opportunity to exercise his right to counsel. She considered the multiple reasons given for the delay, including a lack of privacy at roadside, a desire to wait to confirm all the charges that would be laid against the appellant before implementing his right to counsel, the time it took to fill out a COVID-19 questionnaire, and various steps that had to be taken once the appellant was brought to the station. Although the trial judge considered some of the delay to be reasonable, she did not make that finding concerning about one hour of the delay – from 4:10 p.m. to 5:09 p.m. – flowing from the decision to keep the appellant at roadside while waiting to see if there would be further charges resulting from the first entry into the apartment. She considered that decision to have been “ill-advised” although not made in bad faith.

[25]       Addressing the threshold issue under s. 24(2) – whether the handgun was obtained in a manner that violated the appellant’s Charter rights – the trial judge noted that a causal connection was not required to satisfy this requirement. She found the s. 10(b) breach was contextually and temporally related to the discovery of the gun so as to satisfy this requirement, as the arrest had given rise to both.

[26]       Applying the factors in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, the trial judge first considered the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct. She found this was not a situation where the police had ignored the appellant’s right to counsel. The delay in implementing it did not arise from a “widespread police practice or systemic concern”. As noted, she found some of the delay to have been reasonable and the balance to have arisen from an ill-advised decision that had not been taken in bad faith. She concluded the Charter-infringing conduct was not “very serious.”

[27]       Turning to the impact of the breach on the appellant’s Charter-protected interests, the trial judge identified the values associated with the right to counsel, including protection from self-incrimination and the “lifeline” that access to counsel provides. She found that in this case the impact on the appellant’s interests was “not significant.” The gun was not discovered pursuant to the s. 10(b) breach, but as a result of the arrest pursuant to a warrant.

[28]       On the third factor, society’s interest in adjudication on the merits, the trial judge noted that the handgun was reliable evidence that was essential to the Crown’s case and that its exclusion may have a negative effect on public confidence in the administration of justice.

[29]       Balancing the factors, the trial judge declined to exclude the evidence on the basis of the s. 10(b) breach.

[30]       The trial judge went on to consider “the breaches of … s. 8 in the ultimate decision about whether to exclude the evidence of the gun.” She concluded that the appellant’s and Ms. Duong’s privacy rights were violated by the two entries into the apartment. Accordingly, “the s. 8 Charter breach [had] been established.”

[31]       The first entry, by the ROPE officers, was without the appellant’s consent although they knew the appellant was staying in the apartment and had keys. The trial judge found that Ms. Duong’s consent was invalid as it was not fully informed, and in any event she was unable to consent on behalf of the appellant. Nor were the circumstances exigent so as to permit the warrantless entry in search of Mr. Krecko. The officers could have posted guards at the entrances to prevent his escape (if he was there) and sought a warrant to search the apartment. The second entry, to remove and destroy the drugs observed on the first entry, was also without a warrant or any consent.

[32]       The trial judge described the s. 8 breaches as more serious than the s. 10(b) breach. For the first entry, “there [was] no question that the ROPE should not have gone into that apartment.” Although that entry was brief, “a breach of someone’s privacy in their home is a very serious Charter breach.” With respect to the second entry, to retrieve the drugs, although she had some sympathy for the “mess” the WRPS inherited from the first entry by the ROPE officers, she stated “[t]he behaviour of the police in this matter [was] unacceptable.”

[33]        Although the first entry was close in time to the arrest, the trial judge’s view was that the connection between any s. 8 violation and the discovery of the handgun was not sufficient to engage s. 24(2). Not only was there no causal connection – the handgun had already been seized – there was no contextual connection. The first entry had nothing to do with the appellant’s arrest but was to search for another person. There was no link between what the ROPE officers observed in the apartment and the arrest or the evidence obtained on the arrest. Nor was there any link to the appellant’s rights to counsel relating to the handgun charges. “While the breach of his privacy rights was in the same time period, there was not any other connection. The investigation, arrest, and rights to counsel regarding the drugs … were separate from the investigation, arrest, and rights to counsel regarding the gun.”

[34]       Nevertheless, the trial judge conducted an alternative Grant analysis of the s. 8 breaches. She held the only change from the analysis in relation to the s. 10(b) breach would be that the s. 8 breach was more serious. She considered that concern to have been offset by the “remoteness of the connection” between the breach and the evidence. Although the ROPE officers should not have entered the apartment, they were not there for long. The WRPS had inherited a difficult situation created by the first entry and took appropriate steps not to proceed with charges based on it. Although authorizing a warrantless second entry to retrieve the drugs was “perhaps not the best [choice] … it was a difficult call.” The second entry was “a limited entry done with specific instructions and limitations.” There was no jeopardy to either the appellant or Ms. Duong as a result of their rights having been violated.

[35]       The trial judge concluded that although in some cases a pattern of breaches can justify exclusion, in this case she did not see “a pattern in the behaviour of the police that requires the court to exclude the gun.”

ANALYSIS

(1)         The Standard of Review

[36]       A trial judge’s assessment of the Grant factors is normally afforded considerable deference: R. v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 689, at para. 87. Where all proper factors have been considered and no unreasonable findings have been made, an appellate court must show deference to the trial judge’s “ultimate determination”: Grant, at para. 86; R. v. Hamouth, 2023 ONCA 518, 167 O.R. (3d) 682, at para. 37, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 387.

[37]       However, deference is displaced by an error in principle, a palpable and overriding factual error, or an unreasonable determination. In such cases the appellate court must undertake the s. 24(2) analysis afresh: R. v. McGuffie, 2016 ONCA 365, 131 O.R. (3d) 643, at para. 64; R. v. Just, 2020 ONCA 362, 388 C.C.C. (3d) 273, at para. 21. In undertaking the fresh analysis, regard is to be had to the trial judge’s factual findings: R. v. Mhlongo, 2017 ONCA 562, 355 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 54.

(2)         Discussion

(a)         The Trial Judge Erred in Failing to Consider the s. 10(b) and s. 8 Breaches Together

[38]       In my view, the trial judge erred when she stated there was no link between, on the one hand, the s. 8 breaches (the warrantless entries into the apartment) and on the other hand, the appellant’s arrest, the evidence obtained on the arrest – the handgun – and the delay in the implementation of his rights to counsel relating to the handgun charges in violation of his s. 10(b) rights. This error led her to consider the breaches separately, when she should have considered them together. On her own findings the breaches were related.

[39]       As the trial judge found, the s. 10(b) breach, consisting of a delay in implementing the appellant’s right to counsel, was linked to the evidence obtained on arrest – the handgun – as the arrest had given rise to both. On her own findings, the unreasonable length of the delay in implementing the right to counsel arose exactly because police decided to keep the appellant at roadside, where he could not speak to counsel, while awaiting a decision on additional charges arising from the first Charter-infringing warrantless entry. The second warrantless entry came about, as the trial judge found, because of the “mess” created as a result of the first.

[40]       The trial judge properly found that, although there was no causal relationship, there was a sufficient temporal and contextual link between the discovery of the handgun and the s. 10(b) breach so as to meet the “obtained in a manner” requirement under s. 24(2) and justify consideration of whether the evidence should be excluded: R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, 130 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 72.

[41]       However, given the relationship between the s. 10(b) breach and the s. 8 breach arising from the first warrantless entry, which then gave rise to the s. 8 breach arising from the second warrantless entry, all the breaches should have been considered to be part of the same transaction. Together, they met the “obtained in a manner” requirement under s. 24(2): Pino, at para. 73. They should have been considered cumulatively in the analysis of the Grant factors.

[42]        This type of error can make a difference. A failure to consider related breaches together can distort the view taken of the seriousness of the Charter-offending conduct: Mhlongo, at paras. 60-62. Similarly, a failure to consider related breaches together may fail to capture the overall impact of the offending conduct on the accused’s Charter-protected interests, since they are all “part of the constellation of factors” relevant to this question: Just, at paras. 22, 38 and 54; R. v. Zacharias, 2023 SCC 30, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 571, at para. 49.

[43]       Rather than considering the breaches together for each factor of the Grant analysis, the trial judge conducted a siloed review of the s. 10(b) breach and expressed the conclusion that she would dismiss the application to exclude based on it. Although she went on to consider the s. 8 breaches and conducted an alternative s. 24(2) analysis in relation to them, she did not consider the s. 10(b) breach as part of that analysis. Two separate analyses will not necessarily equate to one analysis that considers the cumulative effect of the related breaches – the whole may be more than the sum of the parts.

[44]       The trial judge’s failure to consider the breaches as related, and to conduct her analysis of the Grant factors on that basis, was an error in principle. It therefore falls to this court to conduct a fresh analysis.

(b)         The Fresh s. 24(2) Analysis

[45]       The trial judge did not find any breach in the arrest and the search incident to it by which the handgun was discovered. Although the appellant describes the Charter-infringing conduct as including a violent arrest, the trial judge rejected the contention that the appellant’s rights were breached by the manner of the arrest. There is no basis to challenge those findings on appeal, and I take them as the starting point.

(i)           The Seriousness of the Charter-Offending Conduct

[46]       I accept the appellant’s submission that, combined, the s. 10(b) breach and the s. 8 breaches were serious.

[47]       The trial judge found the s. 8 breaches were serious. With respect to the first entry, she found that the ROPE officers “should not have gone into that apartment” and that their belief that the WRPS would later obtain a warrant indicated that “they had come to terms with the violation and sought to remedy it with a warrant.” With respect to the second entry, she referred to the police conduct as unacceptable.

[48]       The seriousness of the s.10(b) breach takes on a different colour when considered in combination with the s. 8 breaches. The trial judge found that the s. 10(b) breach was not very serious because the police were not indifferent to the appellant’s right to counsel, portions of the delay were reasonable, there was no suggestion of a widespread or systematic practice, and the unreasonable portion of the delay – about one hour – arose from a choice to have the appellant wait at roadside until a decision was made about further charges prior to transporting him to the station where he could consult counsel in privacy. The trial judge characterized the choice to keep the appellant at roadside in relatively benign terms – ill-considered but not made in bad faith or out of a wilful disregard of the appellant’s rights, and “an attempt to enhance his ability to get full legal advice by knowing all the charges he was facing.” But this fails to take into account that the police engaged in Charter-infringing delay in implementing the right to counsel because they were waiting for a decision about further charges arising from a Charter-infringing entry into the apartment that should never have taken place.

[49]       The Charter-infringing conduct here was, overall, serious. The first Grant factor pulls toward exclusion of the handgun.

(ii)          Impact on Charter-Protected interests

[50]       Even considering the breaches together, the impact on the appellant’s Charter-protected interests was minimal.

[51]       First, the handgun was discovered through a lawful arrest and search incident to arrest before there was any Charter-infringing conduct. There was no causal connection between any of the breaches and the discovery of the handgun.

[52]       In Hamouth, a case also involving a s. 10(b) breach that followed the lawful discovery of firearms, Fairburn A.C.J.O. explained that even where the temporal and contextual connection between the evidence sought to be excluded and the Charter breaches is sufficient to warrant a s. 24(2) analysis, the fact that the evidence was legally discovered prior to the breaches lessens the impact of the breaches and makes admission more likely: at paras. 54-55. She grounded this conclusion in authoritative statements of the Supreme Court and this court.

[53]       For example, in Grant, at para. 122, the court explained that the more likely it is that the impugned evidence would have been discovered without Charter-infringing conduct, the lesser the impact of the breach. In R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745, 143 O.R. (3d) 135, this court held it was correct to consider “the absence of any causal connection between the s. 10(b) breach and the obtaining of the evidence as a factor mitigating the impact of the breach on the appellant’s Charter-protected interests”: at para. 43. In R. v. Keshavarz, 2022 ONCA 312, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 263, at para. 115, the court stated:

[T]here was no causal connection between the breach and the discovery of the Glocks, which the trial judge found had been lawfully seized. Rather, the Glocks were seized hours before the s. 10(b) breach even occurred. In other words, not only were the Glocks discoverable without the breach, but they were actually discovered without the breach. This lessened the impact of the breach on the appellant’s Charter-protected interests, making “admission … more likely”: see Grant, at paras. 122-25. See also Pileggi, at para. 120; Rover, at para. 43; and R. v. Miller, 2018 ONCA 942, 368 C.C.C. (3d) 479, at para. 21. As in R. v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 689, at para. 87, it is entirely “appropriate” to consider the lack of a causal connection in calibrating seriousness under the second stage of the Grant analysis.

[54]       Second, as explained in Hamouth, at para. 56, after considering the lack of a causal connection as mitigating the impact of the breach, it is appropriate to consider the significance of any remaining impact.

[55]       The remaining impact of the s. 10(b) breach was not significant. The right to counsel “is directed at assisting detainees with regaining their liberty and protecting them against the risk of involuntary self-incrimination”. That interest is not impacted where, as here, the appellant did not incriminate himself after s. 10(b) was breached and there is no suggestion he would have regained his liberty earlier: Keshavarz, at para. 114.

[56]       There is also a psychological value in access to counsel. It is a lifeline, permitting access to advice about procedures to which an accused may be subjected and providing a sense they are not entirely at the mercy of the police. Holding a person for a lengthy period without any explanation as to why they cannot access counsel impacts that interest: Rover, at para. 45-46; R. v. Jarrett, 2021 ONCA 758, 498 C.R.R. (2d) 38, at paras. 52-55. However, the length of the delay in this case is not comparable to the 30-hour delay in Jarrett, or the six-hour delay in Rover. Nor is this a case where the appellant was given no explanation about the delay or any indication of when he would be able to access counsel, leaving him completely in the dark on that question. I do not consider the lifeline interest to have been significantly impacted by the s. 10(b) breach in this case.

[57]       The remaining impact of the s. 8 breaches was also not significant. The privacy interest protected by s. 8 of the Charter was impacted by the two warrantless entries, but any relevant impact must be assessed in light of the fact that police decided that no charges would be pursued nor evidence led as a result of them. It is proper to “take the [voluntary] exclusion of evidence arising from Charter breaches into account when determining whether other evidence should also be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2)”, since the voluntary exclusion of evidence lessens the impact of the breach: Hamouth, at paras. 42, 45.

[58]       Although warrantless searches would favour exclusion of evidence gained in those searches, it does not necessarily follow that those searches irretrievably taint all evidence: Just, at para. 54. Here, vindication of the appellant’s s. 8 Charter interest does not require exclusion of other evidence, such as the handgun that was lawfully discovered before those searches were conducted.

[59]       Overall, the impact of the breaches on the Charter-protected rights of the appellant was not significant.

[60]       The second Grant factor favours admission of the handgun.

(iii)         Society’s Interest in Adjudication on the Merits

[61]       The truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by the admission of the handgun. There is no question about the reliability of the evidence, as it is not tainted in any way by the Charter breaches, and it is central to the prosecution of serious offences: Grant, at paras. 79-84.

[62]       Moreover, society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits considers “whether the vindication of the specific Charter violation through the exclusion of evidence extracts too great a toll on the truth seeking goal of the criminal trial”: R. v. Kitaitchik (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 47; Grant, at para. 82. Relevant to that enquiry is whether a remedy has already vindicated the Charter violation such that excluding other evidence extracts too great a toll: Hamouth, at paras. 46-47. Here, the results of the warrantless entries were effectively excluded as no proceedings were brought on the basis of them. The exclusion of the handgun, the discovery of which was not causally related to the Charter breaches, would extract too great a toll on the truth-seeking function of the trial.

[63]       The third Grant factor favours admission of the handgun.

(iv)        Balancing the Factors

[64]       In my view, a proper balancing of the three Grant factors leads to the conclusion that admission of the handgun would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Grant, at para. 85.

DISPOSITION

[65]       I would dismiss the appeal. The appellant’s notice of appeal sought leave to appeal sentence, but this was not pursued in the appellant’s factum or oral argument. I would dismiss the sentence appeal as abandoned.

Released: January 30, 2025 “B.Z.”

“B. Zarnett J.A.”

“I agree. Coroza J.A.”

“I agree. P.J. Monahan J.A.”